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TAMING THE FELONY-MURDER RULE
INTRODUCTION
Like an uncaged lion, the felony-murder rule1 has a propen-
sity for running wild. The rule has been effectively caged in Cali-
fornia over the years by a number of important decisions.2 How-
ever a recent case, People v. Earl,' left the cage door ajar. The
court in Earl upheld a conviction of first degree murder arising
from the felony-murder rule. The felony underlying the convic-
tion was burglary in the first degree,4 resulting from the theft
of store items valued at $20.
The purpose of this comment is to show that a decision such
as the one in Earl is an anachronism. Instead of a limiting appli-
cation of the statutory felony-murder rule, the Earl court chose
a construction which substantially broadens its effect. The hold-
ing singularly fails to follow the lead of the California Supreme
Court which heretofore has circumscribed the felony-murder rule
within specific judicial confines.5
1. At common law an accidental or unintentional homicide committed in
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a felony is murder. The malice
necessary to make the killing murder is constructively imputed by the malice
incident to the initial felony. Such a homicide is known as felony-murder.
40 AM. JUR. 2d Homicide § 72 (1968). The felony-murder rule is codified in
California in CAL. PEN. CODE § 189 (West 1972) which states:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a bomb, poison, lying
in wait, torture, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate, and pre-
meditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of, or at-
tempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act
punishable under Section 288, is murder of the first degree; and all other
kinds of murders are of the second degree.
As used in this section, "bomb" includes any device, substance, or
preparation, other than fixed ammunition or fireworks regulated under
Part 2 (commencing with Section 12500) of Division 11 of the Health
and Safety Code, which is designed to cause an explosion and is capa-
ble of causing death or serious bodily injury.
2. People v. Nichols, 3 Cal. 3d 150, 474 P.2d 673, 89 Cal. Rptr. 721(1970); People v. Wilson, 1 Cal. 3d 431, 462 P.2d 22, 82 Cal. Rptr. 494
(1969); People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442(1965); People v. Jennings, 243 Cal. App. 2d 324, 52 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1966).
But see People v. Salas, 7 Cal. 3d 812, 500 P.2d 7, 103 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1972),
discussed in Note, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 188 (1973).
3. 29 Cal. App. 3d 894, 105 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1973) (Opinion by Brown,
J., with Draper and Caldecott, JJ., concurring).
4. CAL. PEN. CODE § 460 (West 1972) states in pertinent part:
Every burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, trailer coach as de-
fined by the Vehicle Code, or building committed in the nighttime,
and every burglary, whether in the daytime or nighttime, committed by
a person armed with a deadly weapon, or who while in the commission
of such burglary arms himself with a deadly weapon, or who while in
the commission of such burglary assaults any person, is burglary of the
first degree.
5. People v. Nichols, 3 Cal. 3d 150, 474 P.2d 673, 89 Cal. Rptr. 721
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The common-law felony-murder rule provided that if a per-
son killed another while doing or attempting to do an act amount-
ing to a felony, the killing was murder.6 The theory of the rule
was that the commission or attempt to commit a felony showed
sufficient malice aforethought to qualify the killing as murder.7
Existence of the rule was thought to deter felons from killing neg-
ligently or accidentally. 8
In 1872 the California legislature effectively narrowed the
common-law felony-murder rule, promulgating section 189 of the
Penal Code." Under the statutory felony-murder rule only killings
occurring during the perpetration of arson, burglary, robbery and
rape were murders in the first degree. Subsequently section 189,
the felony-murder statute, was amended to include mayhem and
acts punishable under section 288 of the Penal Code.' ° Addition-
ally, felonies not specified in section 189 continued to evoke the
felony-murder rule by judicial fiat, but only to support a finding
of second degree murder."
(1970); People v. Wilson, 1 Cal. 3d 431, 462 P.2d 22, 82 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969);
People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
6. Most jurisdictions have enacted statutes providing that a homicide per-
petrated during the commission, or attempted commission, of any felony, or of
certain specified felonies, shall be deemed murder in the first degree. See
40 AM. JUR. 2d Homicide § 72 (1968).
7. Id.
8. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 442, 445 (1965), citing 0. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 58-59 (1881);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); Report of
the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Cmd. No. 8932, at 35-36 (1949-
53).
9. Penal Code § 189, enacted in 1872, was derived from Cal. Stats.
(1850), ch. 99, § 21, at 231, and from amended Cal. Stats. (1856), ch. 139,
§ 2, at 219. Cal. Pen. Code § 189 (1872) provided that:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, tor-
ture, or by any other kind of wilful, delberate, and premeditated
killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to per-
petrate, arson, rape, robbery or burglary, is murder of the first degree;
and all other kinds of murder are of the second degree.
10. CAL. PEN. CODE § 288 (West 1972) states:
Any person who shall wilfully and lewdly commit any lewd or lascivi-
ous act including any of the acts constituting other crimes provided for
in part one of this code upon or with the body, or any part or member
thereof, of a child under the age of fourteen years, with the intent of
arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual de-
sires of such person or of such child, shall be guilty of a felony and
shall be imprisoned in the State prison for a term of from one year to
life.
11. Inasmuch as section 189 did not specifically state that it was dispensing
with the element of malice aforethought required for murder as defined in sec-
tion 187 of the Penal Code, section 189 could have been construed as a class-
ification statute distinguishing murders in the first and second degrees. But the
possibility of such a restricted view of section 189 was quickly abandoned. The
California Supreme Court in People v. Milton, 145 Cal. 169, 171, 78 P. 549,
550 (1904) clarified the felony-murder rule. The court determined that a
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In recent years the California Supreme Court has taken a
restrictive view of when the statutory and second degree felony-
murder rules should apply. A fundamental limitation placed on
the second degree felony-murder rule is that the court must find
the underlying felony inherently dangerous to human life before
the felony can result in the application of the rule.12  In addition,
other judicial limitations have been placed on the second degree
rule and on the statutory rule. This comment will review each
of these limitations. Then People v. Earl will be analyzed to show
how it unnecessarily leaves a dangerous bit of the statutory rule
unmuzzled with the anomalous result that a felony not inherently
dangerous to human life can precipitate a first degree murder con-
viction.' 3
JUDICIAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE FELONY-MURDER RULE
Before proceeding to an analysis of the Earl case, four signi-
ficant judicial limitations on the felony-murder rule will be ex-
plained. These limitations are: (1) The felony-murder rule ap-
plies only to a killing by the perpetrator of the underlying felony.
(2) The felony-murder rule does not apply when the underlying
felony is an integral part or "included in fact" within the homi-
cide. (3) The definition of arson for purposes of the felony-
murder rule has been significantly narrowed. (4) The second
degree felony-murder rule applies only to felonies inherently dan-
gerous to human life.
The Rule Applies Only to a Killing by the Perpetrator of the
Underlying Felony
In 1965 the California Supreme Court, in People v. Wash-
ington,14 limited the scope of the felony-murder rule to killings
killing occurring during the perpetration of a felony enumerated in section 189
would be murder.
12. People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 489 P.2d 1361, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1971);
People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1966).
For a summary of the early development of the common-law felony-murder rule
see Pike, What is Second Degree Murder in California?, 9 S. CAL. L. REV. 112,
118-19 (1936).
13. The injustice of this result is emphasized by comparing sentences for
first degree murder, second degree murder and manslaughter. A first degree
murder conviction can result in a life sentence with eligibility for parole within
84 months. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 190, 3049 (West 1972). A second degree mur-
der conviction results in a sentence of 5 years to life with eligibility for parole
in 20 months. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 190, 3046 (West 1972). A sentence for
conviction of manslaughter can be 6 months to 15 years, with eligibility for
parole within 6 months. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 18b, 193 (West 1972).
14. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442(1965). For a discussion of People v. Washington and related cases see Note,
California Rewrites Felony Murder Rule, 18 ST.. L. REv. 690 (1966).
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committed by the felon. In Washington, while the defendant and
an accomplice were attempting to rob a service station, the station
attendant shot and killed the accomplice. Initially, the court reaf-
firmed that all killings, whether accidental or purposeful, com-
mitted in the perpetration of one of the felonies listed in section
189, are murders of the first degree. Significantly, the court con-
cluded that the felony-murder doctrine ascribes malice afore-
thought only to the felon who kills in the perpetration of an inher-
ently dangerous felony. The court reasoned that, if the killing
was not committed by the felon or his accomplice, it was not a
killing committed to perpetrate the felony. The killing in Wash-
ington was committed to thwart a felony. Therefore, to include
such killings within section 189 would expand the meaning of
murder committed in the perpetration of a felony beyond common
understanding.15
Applying the reasoning in Washington, the court of appeal
in People v. Jennings6 held that it is not murder if an accomplice
kills himself accidentally while engaged in the commission of the
crime of arson. Consequently, his principal may not be charged
with first degree murder because the act of accidentally killing
oneself does not constitute "unlawful killing" within the meaning
of Penal Code section 187-even if committed during the perpe-
tration of an inherently dangerous felony. 17 The court's decision
was consistent with the perception of the felony-murder doctrine
as a device to protect the public, not the lawbreaker, from acci-
dental or negligent killings. Furthermore, to rule otherwise
would have required an unreasonable extension of the definition
of murder, since the killing was not "of another person." Yet
had the court not been following the limiting precedent enunciated
in Washington, it might have viewed the killing as murder by the
surviving co-felon and upheld a charge of first degree murder pre-
dicated on the felony-murder rule.
The "Included in Fact" Limitation
The "included in fact" limitation prohibits the use of the
felony-murder rule when the felony forms an integral part of the
homicide. For example, if the felonious intent of a burglary is
assault with a deadly weapon and a killing results from that as-
sault, the burglary will be viewed as included in fact within the
homicide. Since there was but one act and intent, the felony-
15. 62 Cal. 2d at 731, 402 P.2d at 135, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
16. 243 Cal. App. 2d 324, 52 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1966).
17. CAL. PEN. CODE § 187 (West 1972) defines murder as follows: "Mur-
der is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought."
[Vol. 14
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murder rule will not apply. It would be improper for a court
to instruct the jury that the assault serves the felonious intent re-
quirement for burglary and that the burglary raises the homicide
resulting from the assault to first degree murder.
In People v. Ireland,"s a 1969 decision of far-reaching im-
portance, the California Supreme Court first applied the "included
in fact" limitation. The Ireland holding was that a second de-
gree felony-murder instruction should not be given when it is
based upon a felony which is an integral part of the homicide.19
The second degree felony-murder instruction had been given by
the trial court although the only underlying felony was the assault
with a deadly weapon which caused the killing.20 The court
noted that, if the felony-murder rule applied to all cases in which
the homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assault,
juries would be precluded from considering the issue of malice
in the great majority of homicides.2'
Later in 1969, in People v. Wilson,22 the California Supreme
Court imposed the "included in fact" limitation on the statutory
felony-murder rule, thereby significantly curbing its effect. 23  The
Wilson court reversed a first degree murder conviction based on
a burglary. An integral part of the crime of burglary is intent
to commit petty theft or any felony.24  The defendant in Wilson
intended to commit an assault with a deadly weapon. Because of
this felonious intent the defendant's entry into his wife's apartment
was a burglary. The assault was also an integral part of the en-
suing homicide.
Justice Mosk, speaking for the court, 25 concluded that a bur-
glary based on intent to commit an assault with a deadly weapon
is included within a charge of murder and cannot support a fel-
ony-murder instruction. 26  To conclude otherwise would have al-
lowed the use of an element of the homicide as the underlying
18. 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969).
19. Id. at 539, 450 P.2d at 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
20. The jury was given an instruction based upon CALJIC No. 305 (revised
1958). The instruction given provided in relevant part:
• . . the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought is
murder of the second degree in any of the following cases: . . . Three,
when the killing is a direct causal result of the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate a felony inherently dangerous to human life, such as an
assault with a deadly weapon.
70 Cal. 2d at 538, 450 P.2d at 589, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
21. 70 Cal. 2d at 539, 450 P.2d at 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
22. 1 Cal. 3d 431, 462 P.2d 22, 82 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969).
23. Id. at 438, 462 P.2d at 26, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
24. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 459 (West 1972).
25. The decision was 6-1, McComb, J., dissenting.
26. 1 Cal. 3d at 442, 462 P.2d at 29, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
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felony to support the felony-murder rule-a bootstrap approach
already rejected in People v. Ireland.2 7  It should be remembered
that the felony-murder rule substitutes the malicious intent to
commit a felony other than murder for the malice and premedita-
tion required for murder. Therefore, unless there is a felony
clearly distinct from the killing there is no logic in applying the
felony-murder rule. The court stressed that the purpose of the
felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or
accidentally. When a person enters a building with an intent
to assault a victim with a deadly weapon, the felony-murder rule
has no prophylactic effect."' That doctrine can serve its purpose
only when applied to a felony independent of the homicide.29  The
rule does not purport to deter those bent on murder; it is meant
to prevent killings by those engaged in felonies which need not
result in murder.
The Wilson court had little difficulty applying the reasoning
of Ireland, which dealt with a court-made rule, to the statutory
felony-murder rule, declaring that "the statutory source of the rule
does not compel us to apply it in disregard of logic and reason."8 0
Moreover, the court in Wilson stated that other jurisdictions which
have adopted the "included in fact" limitation l have done so in
the face of similar statutes codifying the felony-murder rule.2" The
27. Ireland expressly overruled People v. Talbot, 64 Cal. 2d 691, 414 P.2d
633, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1966) and People v. Hamilton, 55 Cal. 2d 881, 362
P.2d 473, 13 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1961) insofar as those cases held that a felony-
murder instruction could be predicated upon a burglary when the felonious intent
for the burglary was intent to commit an assault with a deadly weapon.
28. 1 Cal. 3d at 440, 462 P.2d at 28, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
29. The Wilson court did not suggest that there could not be relevant dif-
ferences between crimes committed inside dwellings and those committed outside.
The court recognized that persons within dwellings are in greater peril from in-
truders bent on stealing or engaging in other felonious conduct. However, the
court observed that where the intended felony of the "burglar" is an assault with
a deadly weapon, the likelihood of homicide from the lethal weapon is not sig-
nificantly increased by the site of the assault. 1 Cal. 3d at 441, 462 P.2d at 28,
82 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
30. 1 Cal. 3d at 441, 462 P.2d at 29, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 501, citing County
of Sacramento v. Hickman, 66 Cal. 2d 841, 841 n.6, 428 P.2d 593, 598 n.6,
59 Cal. Rptr. 609, 614 n.6 (1967).
31. The "included in fact" limitation is incorporated within the merger doc-
trine. This doctrine entails the concept that only felonies independent of the
homicide can support a felony-murder instruction; felonies that are an integral
part of the homicide are merged in the homicide. The Ireland court did not
say that the limitations it would apply would assume the exact outlines and
proportions of the merger doctrine enunciated in other jurisdictions but that the
reasoning underlying that doctrine is basically sound and therefore should be
applied to the extent that it is consistent with the laws and policies of this state.
32. 1 Cal. 3d at 442, 462 P.2d at 29, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 501, citing State v.
Severns, 158 Kan. 453, 148 P.2d 488 (1944); People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100,
158 N.E. 35 (1927); People v. Wagner, 245 N.Y. 143, 156 N.E. 644 (1927);
People v. Hiuter, 184 N.Y. 237, 77 N.E. 6 (1906); State v. Branch, 244 Ore. 97,
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mere existence of a felony-murder statute was not sufficient reason
for the court to refrain from a limiting construction of the felony-
murder doctrine.
The court's approach in Wilson and Ireland was followed
in People v. Sears." In Sears the defendant entered the cottage
of his estranged wife intending to assault her and his stepdaugh-
ter, thereby committing a burglary before the fatal assault. The
court, reiterating the logic of Wilson and Ireland, held that the
giving of the felony-murder instruction was error in this case
since the defendant was guilty of burglary only because he entered
the cottage with intent to commit the assault.
The parameters of the "included in fact" limitation have not
been clearly defined. One commentator suggests the court may
be led to treat forcible rapes, robberies, and larcenous burglaries
in the same manner as it did the burglaries based on assault in
Wilson and Sears.84 Such treatment would eliminate most of the
statutory felony-murder rule because only homicides committed
in the perpetration of arson, mayhem, or child molestation would
still be first degree felony murders.8" Although it is not clear
if the court will extend the "included in fact" limitation, it is at
least apparent that the limitation is a viable one that is arguably
available for additional taming of the felony-murder rule.
Limiting the Definition of Arson for Purposes of the Felony-Mur-
der Rule
The decision in People v. Nichols8 involved an interpre-
tation of the meaning of arson in section 189, the statutory fel-
ony-murder rule. The defendant argued that the court erred in
instructing the jury that a killing which results from the burning
of a motor vehicle is murder in the first degree. He contended
that the burning of a motor vehicle, a violation of the Penal
Code,8 7 is not arson within the meaning of section 189.
415 P.2d 766 (1966). See generally Note, The Doctrine of Merger in Felony-
Murder and Misdemeanor-Manslaughter, 35 ST. JoHN L. REv. 109 (1960).
33. 2 Cal. 3d 180, 465 P.2d 847, 84 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1970). For an analysis
of People v. Wilson, People v. Ireland and People v. Sears see Note, The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court Assaults the Felony-Murder Rule, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1059
(1970).
34. Note, supra note 33, at 1069.
35. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 189 (West 1972).
36. 3 Cal. 3d 150, 474 P.2d 673, 89 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1970).
37. CAL. PEN. CODE § 449a (West 1972) reads:
Any person who wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes
to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any bar-
rack, cock, crib, rick or stack of hay, corn, wheat, oats, barley or other
grain or vegetable product of any kind; or any field of standing hay or
grain of any kind; or any pile of coal, wood or other fuel; or any pile
of planks, boards, posts, rails or other lumber; or any streetcar, railway
1973]
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The Nichols court first traced the history of the law of arson
in California. 5 In 1872, with the adoption of the Penal Code,
the legislature retreated from an earlier, broad definition of ar-
son3 9 and restricted the crime to the burning of buildings capable
of affording shelter to human beings.4" Only a killing committed
in the perpetration of arson as then defined by the Penal Code
triggered the first degree felony-murder rule of section 189.41 In
1929 the legislature completely revised the arson chapter of the
Penal Code. Section 447a42 defined arson as the willful and
malicious burning of a dwelling house or its outbuildings; section
448a43 made it a felony to burn buildings which were not dwelling
houses; and section 449a" made it a felony to burn motor vehi-
cles or any personal property of another.
The acts proscribed by section 448a have been held to be
arson by the California Supreme Court.45  The court has also
held that a violation of section 448a is arson within the meaning
of the first degree felony-murder rule.46 However, in determining
the legislature's intent with respect to section 449a (the burning
of motor vehicles), the Nichols court had no clear guidelines. To
car, ship, boat or other watercraft, automobile or other motor vehicle;
or any other personal property not herein specifically named except a
trailer coach as defined in Section 635 of the Vehicle Code; . . . shall
upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less
than one nor more than three years.
38. 3 Cal. 3d at 159-60, 474 P.2d at 678-79, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27.
39. The definition of arson, the burning of the dwelling house and outbuild-
ings of another, was broadened to include the burning of other buildings and
standing crops. Deaths occurring in consequence of arson were to be deemed
murder. Cal. Stats. (1850), ch. 99, § 56, at 234-35; Cal. Stats. (1856), ch. cx,
§ 5, at 132; ch. cxxxix, § 2, at 219.
40. Cal. Pen. Code § 447 (1872) (repealed 1929) stated: "Arson is the
willful and malicious burning of a building, with intent to destroy it." For a
thorough treatment of the development of the arson laws in California see
Bolton, Arson in California: Part i, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 375 (1962).
41. Cal. Pen. Code § 189 (1872), Code Commissioner's Note § 455.
42. Cal. Stats. (1929), ch. 25, § 1, at 46 provided:
Any person who wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or
causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any
dwelling house, or any kitchen, shop, barn, stable or other outhouse that
is parcel thereof, or belonging to or adjoining thereto . . . shall be
guilty of arson.
43. Cal. Stats. (1929), ch. 25, § 2, at 46 provided:
Any person who wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or
causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of a
barn, stable, garage or other building, whether the property of himself
or another, not a parcel of a dwelling house; or any shop, storehouse,
warehouse, factory, mill or other building, whether the property of him-
self or another; or any church, meeting house, courthouse, workhouse,
school, jail or other public building, or any public bridge, shall upon
conviction thereof be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than one
or more than ten years.
44. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 449a (West 1972).
45. In re Bramble, 31 Cal. 2d 43, 50, 187 P.2d 411, 415 (1947).
46. People v. Chavez, 50 Cal. 2d 778, 788, 329 P.2d 907, 913 (1958).
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find that section 449a was not intended to be included within
the meaning of arson, the court resolutely waded through the in-
tricacies of statutory analysis. Examination of the arson statutes
by the court disclosed that prior to 1929 vessels and boats were
defined as buildings capable of sheltering human beings; anyone
who willfully and maliciously burned a vessel or boat committed
arson and was guilty of first degree murder if death resulted. But
the 1929 amendments placed vessels and boats in section 449a
along with stacks of grains and vegetables.4 7  The Nichols court
acknowledged that such placement could mean that the legislature
believed the burning of property in that section was as dangerous
to human life as the burning of vessels and boats. However, the
comparatively lenient punishment given for violations of that sec-
tion (one to three years imprisonment) belies that view. The
lenient punishment was persuasive evidence to the court in Nichols
that the legislature considered violations of that section less dan-
gerous to life than the burning of buildings prohibited by sec-
tions 447a and 448a which are punishable by from two to twenty
years imprisonment. Moreover, the court was cognizant that in
1959 the legislature removed trailer coaches from section 449a
and placed them in section 447a.48 The court found in this en-
actment an implication that the burning of motor vehicles is not
arson. Furthermore, the prohibitions of section 449a overlapped
certain burnings (for example, burning a haystack) termed mali-
cious mischief by section 600.19 The court found it unreasonable
to presume the legislature intended the death penalty to apply to
accidental killings committed in the burning of a stack of hay,
wheat, or a pile of boards. 50 Therefore, the court concluded
the legislature did not intend the word "arson", as used in the
first degree felony-murder provisions of section 189, to apply to
the burning of those items enumerated in section 449a. The
47. 3 Cal. 3d at 161-62, 474 P.2d at 680-81, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 728-29.
48. Cal. Stats. (1959), ch. 1462, §§ 1, 2, at 3756-57. In so doing the
legislature made punishment for burning a trailer coach far more severe than for
setting fire to other types of vehicles. The apparent reason the legislature made
such a distinction was that the term "trailer coach," as defined in section 635 of
the Vehicle Code was limited to a "vehicle, other than a motor vehicle, designed
for human habitation." Therefore, a vehicle expressly intended for use as a
dwelling place was included in section 447a.
49. Section 600 was renumbered 449b and amended by Cal. Stats. (1966),
1st Exec. Sess., ch. 58, § 6, at 443. It apparently did not seem reasonable to
the Nichols court that the mere renumbering of section 600 to 449b manifested
an intention that the offense, for 94 years considered malicious mischief, would
now constitute arson.
50. For purposes of determining whether the legislature intended the burn-
ing of a motor vehicle to constitute arson within the meaning of the first degree
felony-murder rule of section 189, the court stated it could not sever that specific
act from the other acts prohibited by the statute. 3 Cal. 3d at 162 n.10, 474
P.2d at 681 n.10, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 729 n.10.
19731
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court admitted the conclusion was not free from doubt but reiter-
ated that all reasonable doubts as to the proper interpretation and
construction of a criminal statute must be resolved in favor of the
defendant. 1
Artful use of the legislative history of arson enabled the
Nichols court to cage a felony which would otherwise have al-
lowed the felony-murder rule to roam freely within the broad con-
fines of the law of arson. This caging by the court did not result,
however, in a reversal of conviction for murder. The court
viewed the felony of burning a motor vehicle in the abstract, de-
claring it to be a felony inherently dangerous to human life, and
applied the second degree felony-murder rule. 2
The Second Degree Felony-Murder Rule Applies Only to Felonies
Inherently Dangerous to Human Life
The decision in People v. Washington58 demonstrated that
the imputation of malice from the underlying felony to the homi-
cide has to have some plausible basis. The Washington court
viewed the felony-murder doctrine as a highly artificial concept
to be extended only with caution. From this perspective the court
in People v. Phillips54 refused to authorize a second degree felony-
murder instruction when the underlying felony was grand theft. 5
The Phillips court, applying the reasoning of People v. Williams,"6
ruled that only felonies inherently dangerous to human life can
support application of the felony-murder rule. In assessing the
peril to human life inherent in any felony, the teaching of Wil-
liams was that the felony should be viewed in the abstract, not
in relation to the facts of a particular case.5 7  The Phillips deci-
sion declared it would not assess the factual elements of the de-
fendant's conduct to see if his crime was inherently dangerous
because such fragmentizing of the defendant's conduct would
widen the application of the second degree felony-murder rule be-
51. 3 Cal. 3d at 162, 474 P.2d at 681, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 729, citing People v.
Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 352 n.2, 450 P.2d 33, 35-36 n.2, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713,
715-16 n.2 (1969); People v. Smith, 44 Cal. 2d 77, 79, 279 P.2d 33, 34 (1955).
52. 3 Cal. 3d at 163, 474 P.2d at 681, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
53. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
54. 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1966).
55. The defendant, a doctor of chiropractic, allegedly caused removal of a
cancer sufferer from the hospital by representing that he could cure the cancer
without surgery. He was found guilty, inter alia, of felony grand theft, a viola-
tion of Penal Code § 484.
56. 63 Cal. 2d 452, 460 P.2d 647, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1965).
57. The Williams holding disapproved any contrary implications in People v.
Pulley, 225 Cal. App. 2d 366, 37 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1964). Pulley held that a sec-
ond degree felony-murder instruction was properly based on a violation of Ve-
hicle Code § 10851 (automobile theft) because the theft in question led to a
high speed chase and a collision which took the life of the victim.
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yond calculation.58  Not only would the felony-murder rule be
evoked by specific felonies which are inherently dangerous but
by any felony during which the defendant endangered life. Since
grand theft, viewed in the abstract, was not considered inher-
ently dangerous by the Phillips court, it could not justify a second
degree felony-murder instruction.
Two recent California Supreme Court decisions, People v.
Satchel59 and People v. Lopez, 0 follow the sound reasoning of
Phillips and Williams. In Satchell, the court held that violation
of a statute prohibiting the possession of a concealable weapon
by one previously convicted of a felony"1 is not a felony inherently
dangerous to human life. Therefore, the giving of the second
degree felony-murder instruction was error.0 2  The court empha-
sized the People v. Washington interpretation of the scope of the
felony-murder rule and declined to extend the rule beyond what
it considered to be a rational purpose.6 8 This interpretation ac-
knowledged the substantial body of legal scholarship which has
concluded that the felony-murder doctrine not only "erodes the
relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability" but
also is usually unnecessary for conviction. 4
58. 64 Cal. 2d at 583, 414 P.2d at 361, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
59. 6 Cal. 3d 28, 489 P.2d 1361, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1971).
60. 6 Cal. 3d 45, 489 P.2d 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1971).
61. CAL. PEN. CODE § 12021 (West 1972) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who is not a citizen of the United States and any
person who has been convicted of a felony under the laws of the United
States, of the State of California, or any other state, government, or
country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, who owns
or has in his possession or under his custody or control any pistol, re-
volver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person is
guilty of a public offense, and shall be punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison not exceeding fifteen years, or in a county jail not ex-
ceeding one year or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500),
or by both.
62. The opinion notes that the jury was given the following CALJIC in-
struction on second degree felony murder:
The unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, uninten-
tional or accidental, which occurs as a direct causal result of the com-
mission of or attempt to commit a felony inherently dangerous to human
life, namely the crime of possession of a concealable firearm by a felon,
and where there was in the mind of the perpetrator the specific intent
to commit such crime, is murder of the second-degree. The specific
intent to commit the crime of possession of a concealable firearm by a
felon and the commission of or attempt to commit such crime must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (The italicized words were
added by the court as indicated by the instruction form to fit the cir-
cumstances of the particular case.)
6 Cal. 3d at 31-32, 489 P.2d at 1363, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
63. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783, 402 P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965).
See text accompanying note 15 supra.
64. In an article discussing the need for revision of the Penal Code, the late
Stanford law professor, Herbert Packer, suggested the felony-murder rule is un-
necessary in almost all cases in which it is applied. He maintained that con-
viction in those cases can be predicated on the normal rules pertaining to mur-
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To apply the Washington doctrine in Satchell, the court had
to overcome the hurdle presented by previous decisions which un-
equivocally stated that the carrying of a concealed weapon by a
felon would support a second degree felony-murder instruction. 65
The court relied on People v. Williams66 and People v. Lovato67
to make the leap necessary for its ultimate holding. The victim
in Williams was an illegal supplier of methedrine who was killed
with a knife during an affray which occurred after the defendants
demanded he pay a debt either in methedrine or money. The
jury was given a second degree felony-murder instruction based
on the crime of conspiracy to possess methedrine without a pre-
scription. The California Supreme Court held that the instruction
was erroneous because the subject felony, viewed in the abstract,
is not inherently dangerous.68 In Lovato the issue was whether
the possession of a concealable firearm by an alien"0 is inherently
dangerous to human life. The court of appeal held it is not.
Coupling the rationale of Williams with the holding of
Lovato, the Satchell court concluded that the existence of a pre-
vious conviction of any felony, which thus makes the defendant
criminally liable for possession of a concealed weapon, could not
logically determine whether a current homicide was committed
with malice. 70  The court observed that there are a number of
der and accomplice liability. He concluded that in a small residuum of cases
there may be a substantial question whether the rule reaches a rational result or
at least distracts attention from more relevant criteria. Packer, The Case for
Revision of the Penal Code, 13 STAN. L. REV. 252, 259 (1961).
65. 6 Cal. 3d at 35, 489 P.2d at 1366, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 38, citing People v.
Robillard, 55 Cal. 2d 88, 98, 358 P.2d 295, 300, 10 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172 (1960);
People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d 716, 732, 401 P.2d 665, 674-75, 44 Cal. Rptr.
193, 202-03 (1965); People v. Ford, 60 Cal. 2d 772, 795, 388 P.2d 892, 907-08,
36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 635-36 (1964), and 65 Cal. 2d 41, 57, 416 P.2d 132, 142, 52
Cal. Rptr. 228, 238 (1966).
66. 63 Cal. 2d 452, 406 P.2d 647, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1965).
67. 258 Cal. App. 2d 290, 65 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1968).
68. 63 Cal. 2d at 458, 406 P.2d at 650, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
69. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 12021 (West 1972). Penal Code § 12021, as
applied to aliens, has been held to be a denial of equal protection of the law and
is unconstitutional. People v. Rappard, 28 Cal. App. 3d 306, 104 Cal. Rptr. 535
(1972).
70. 6 Cal. 3d at 40-41, 489 P.2d at 1369-70, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 41-42. Section
12021 of the Penal Code provides in part that any person who has been con-
victed of a felony is guilty of a public offense if he carries a concealed firearm.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 12021 (West 1972). Because a violation of section 12021 is
punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony, the Satchell court focused on the
previous felony conviction which makes possession of a concealed weapon a pun-
ishable offense. 6 Cal. 3d at 40 n.18, 489 P.2d at 1369 n.18, 98 Cal. Rptr. at
41 n.18. In so doing, the court did not determine whether the particular felony
of which the defendant was convicted was inherently dangerous, but rather
whether felonies generally could be considered acts so inherently dangerous to
human life as to impute malice for purposes of the felony-murder doctrine.
id. at 39-40, 489 P.2d at 1369, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
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felonies which do not manifest a propensity on the part of the
perpetrator for acts dangerous to human life.7' The statute pro-
hibiting possession of a concealable weapon does not specify
which felonies will invoke the statute; apparently any felony will
do. 2 The court explicitly rejected any assumption that every
armed felon presents a significantly greater danger to human life
than a non-felon similarly armed." Absent such an assumption,
the imputation of malice to the armed felon could not be justi-
fied. Therefore, the court felt compelled to conclude that the
carrying of a concealed weapon by one previously convicted of
a felony is not an act inherently dangerous to human life and
will not support a second degree felony-murder instruction.71
People v. Lopez,75 decided the same day as Satchell, applied
similar reasoning, holding that escape from a county or city penal
facility is not an offense inherently dangerous to human life. Here,
as in Satchell, the court averred that the decision did not hinder
the prosecution from proving that the killing was done with malice
aforethought and therefore was murder. The court simply ex-
cised the short-cut provided by the felony-murder doctrine. With-
out that doctrine, the crucial mental state of malice aforethought
must be demonstrated to the trier of fact instead of being imputed
from commission of the underlying felony.
Limiting utilization of the second degree felony-murder rule
to felonies inherently dangerous in the abstract has the potential
of curtailing the second degree rule so that its impact will be in-
creasingly diminished. There are few felonies that courts will be
willing to label as inherently dangerous. When a felony is so
described the court's finding can be challenged for failing to fol-
low the Williams rule of viewing the felony in the abstract. Such
taming of the second degree felony-murder rule will improve the
administration of criminal justice by strictly limiting an artificial
means of imputing malice.
RECENT DECISION FAILS TO LIMIT APPLICATION
OF THE FELONY-MURDER RULE
Background
In People v. Earl6 the court of appeal upheld application
of the statutory felony-murder rule when the underlying felony
was burglary. The decision recognized that the California Su-
71. 6 Cal. 3d at 40, 489 P.2d at 1369, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 41-42.
72. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 12021 (West 1972).
73. 6 Cal. 3d at 40, 489 P.2d at 1370, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
74. Id. at 41, 489 P.2d at 1371, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
75. Id. at 45, 489 P.2d at 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
76. 29 Cal. App. 3d 894, 105 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1973).
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preme Court has taken a restrictive view in interpreting both
the judicial and statutory felony-murder rules.7  Moreover, the
Earl court found the defendant's argument against applying the
rule to be rational. The court felt constrained, however, by ex-
pressions of the supreme court in People v. Talbot78 and by the
legislature. 79 Justice Brown found persuasive the dictum in Tal-
bot which stated that the crime of burglary referred to in section
189 is the same as presently set forth in section 459.80 Although
the Earl court admitted it would be in keeping with the basic
principle of the felony-murder rule to allow its application only
to burglaries of an inherently dangerous type, the court concluded
such a narrowing of the rule must be undertaken by the legisla-
ture or by the supreme court. 81 Therefore, the court of appeal
reached a conclusion which it apparently would have preferred
to avoid-one that allows a broad application of the felony-mur-
der rule.8 2
Facts of the Cases8
At about 3:15 p.m. on December 5, 1969 a police officer
saw Milton Earl and Jimmie Lee Terrell walking together in the
direction of a department store. At about 4:00 p.m. John Tapp,
the proprietor of a nearby service station, saw a black youth 4
leave the office portion of his gas station which was near the store.
At 5:00 p.m. Tapp noticed that a loaded gun which he had earlier
placed in a desk drawer was missing. Tapp recalled no one else
in the office during this time except the black youth he noticed
walking toward the department store after leaving the station.
Also at about 4:00 p.m., Earl and Terrell were seen entering
the department store together and soon thereafter approaching the
jewelry department. Earl remained at the jewelry counter looking
at watches while Terrell went to the men's department where
he put on a leather jacket. The clerk at the watch counter sus-
pected Earl had taken some watches. When she was called to
77. Id. at 899, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
78. 64 Cal. 2d 691, 414 P.2d 633, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1966).
79. CAL. PEN. CODE § 189 (West 1972).
80. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 900, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 835-36.
81. Id., 105 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
82. A petition for hearing by the supreme court from the decision of the
California court of appeal was filed, No. 15149 (Feb. 13, 1973), to settle
questions of law relating to the felony-murder rule. The hearing was denied
March 8, 1973.
83. The facts are compiled from appellant's and respondent's opening briefs
in the original direct appeal to the California Supreme Court from imposition
of the death penalty.
84. Both Earl and Terrell are black.
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the telephone, Earl went to the men's department and was later
observed leaving a fitting room with bulky looking pants.
Terrell went toward the exit door wearing a leather jacket.
The guard at the door took Terrell, who immediately admitted
taking a watch and a jacket, to the office. Another guard was
assigned to the door.
Earl then approached this guard and asked whether he had
seen a man with a brown hat. A witness nearby said he heard
someone shouting, "Help me, help me!" and then saw the guard
on the ground and observed Earl fire three shots at him. Earl
then ran from the scene pursued by several employees who caught
him. After the police arrived and arrested him, a search of his
person disclosed a watch, bearing the department store's tag, in
his rear pocket and a second pair of pants worn under his outside
pants. Neither he nor Terrell had money or a membership card
for making purchases. The guard died of a bullet wound in the
brain.
Earl appealed his conviction of first degree murder, for
which he received the death penalty, and the convictions of burglary
in the first degree and attempted kidnapping." The automatic
appeal to the supreme court was transferred to the court of appeal
because of the decision in People v. Anderson"6 holding the death
penalty unconstitutional.
The Reasoning of the Court
In response to Earl's contention that there was not sufficient
evidence to establish that he entered the department store with
the specific intent to commit theft, the court stated the basic propo-
sition that a person who enters a store with the intent to commit
theft is guilty of burglary.8 7 Although the existence of the spe
cific intent charged at the time of entering a building is necessary
to constitute burglary, this element is rarely capable of direct
proof and usually must be inferred from all of the facts and cir-
cumstances disclosed by the evidence.88 The court concluded that
even though commission of a theft in a store is insufficient alone to
establish a prima facie case of burglary, taken with the other circum-
85. After the shooting Earl attempted to commandeer a car in the parking
lot.
86. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972). In this land-
mark case the supreme court held that the death penalty is cruel and unusual
punishment and therefore prohibited by the CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6. See
Comment, Anderson and the Judicial Function, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 739 (1972).
87. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 459 (West 1972).
88. People v. Earl, 29 Cal. App. 3d 894, 896, 105 Cal. Rptr. 831, 833(1973), citing People v. Terry, 202 Cal. App. 2d 604, 608, 20 Cal. Rptr. 915,
919 (1962).
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stances of the case, it is clear that, if Earl was able to form any
intent upon entering the store, it was an intent to steal.8 9
Earl contended that the felony-murder rule should not apply
because shoplifting would not have been a burglary as originally
defined by Penal Code section 189. The definition of burglary
at that time90 made it a crime which could be said to be inher-
ently dangerous to human life. Earl noted that it is this key ele-
ment of danger that connects all crimes in section 189. The legis-
lature, he maintained, did not intend to include in that section
the act of petty theft, which is a property crime not ordinarily
presenting any danger of physical harm to people. Earl con-
tended it would be unreasonable to presume that the legislature
would indirectly expand the felony-murder rule to include non-
dangerous activities that have been added to the burglary statute.
The legislature has amended section 189, but in doing so only
the most dangerous type of activities have been added.9'
Justice Brown admitted application of the felony-murder rule
can lead to an illogical result. If a person formed the intent to
commit a theft before entering the store, he could be convicted
of first degree murder under the statutory felony-murder rule. By
contrast, if he aimlessly entered the store and later committed
theft, he could not be convicted even of second degree murder
unless the prosecution could prove the element of malice and in-
tent to kill. In the latter situation, no quick route to conviction
would be provided by use of the felony-murder rule. To obtain
a second degree murder conviction the prosecution would have
to provide proof of malice and intent to kill.
89. Appellant had attacked the conviction of burglary, arguing that the evi-
dence showed he was incapable of forming the intent to steal at the time of
entry because he was under the influence of drugs. The court found little
corroborative evidence to show he had taken the drugs, noted that the appellant's
actions were not inconsistent with behavior of persons acting with unimpaired
capacity, and concluded that in the face of the reasonable inferences that could
be drawn from the total circumstances, it cannot be said that as a matter of
law appellant lacked the specific intent to steal when he entered the store.
29 Cal. App. 3d at 897-98, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 833-34.
90. The 1872 statute provided:
Every person who, in the night-time, forcibly breaks and enters, or
who without force enters through any open door, window, or other
aperture, any house, room, apartment, tenement, or any tent, vessel,
water craft, or railroad car, with the intent to commit grand or petty
larceny, or any felony, is guilty of burglary.
Historical Note, CAL. PEN. CODE § 459 (West Ann. 1972).
91. Section 189 was amended in 1873 to include mayhem. Code Amend.
(1873-74), ch. 614, § 16, at 427. In 1949, acts punishable under section 288
were included within the enumerated felonies. Cal. Stats. (1949), 1st Exec.
Sess., ch. 16, § 1, at 30. A 1969 amendment added "a bomb" as a means of
perpetrating a murder of the first degree. Cal. Stats. (1969), ch. 923, § 1, at
1852. It is certainly arguable, however, that violations of section 288 do not
fall within the classification of the most dangerous type of activities. See note 10
supra.
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Although the Earl court agreed it would be reasonable to
limit application of the felony-murder rule to certain classes of
burglaries,92 the court concluded that such a decision must be
undertaken by the legislature or by the supreme court.98 This
conclusion by the Earl court is vulnerable because it is based on
the erroneous assumptions that (1) the scope of felonies enum-
erated in section 189 is not open to interpretation; (2) stare de-
cisis demands that dictum in People v. Talbot94 be followed.
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING
The Court Failed to Interpret Legislative Intent
The scope of felonies enumerated in section 189 is arguably
an open question because the California Supreme Court has al-
ready limited the breadth of one such felony, arson, by determin-
ing the intent of the legislature. 95 An interpretation of legislative
intent would have allowed the Earl court to limit the scope of
burglary for purposes of section 189. The readily ascertainable
abundance of historical facts used by the Nichols court9" to
cage the scope of arson was equally available to the Earl court
for confining the scope of burglary. A review of the law of bur-
glary in California demonstrates significant changes since 1872.
A court could reasonably conclude that the legislature did not
intend all aspects of burglary as it is defined today to call forth
the felony-murder rule.
In 1872 when Penal Code section 189 was first enacted,
many crimes were punishable as felonies which in no way in-
volved the definitional element of danger to human life. Thus
in enacting section 189 the legislature sought to limit the felony-
murder rule to enumerated felonies which were, by definition, in-
herently dangerous. One of the felonies which the legislature in-
cluded in the original section 189 was burglary. At that time
burglary was a crime defined as occurring in the nighttime and
involving entry of a "house, room, apartment, or tenement, or
any tent, vessel, watercraft, or railroad car of another." 97
Inclusion of burglary within the confines of the felony-mur-
der rule as it was defined by statute in 1872 was justified. The
requirement that the defendant intend to commit a serious crime
92. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 900, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
93. This court determination was based on the actual wording of Penal Code
§ 189 and dictum in People v. Talbot, 64 Cal. 2d 691, 414 P.2d 633, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 417 (1966). See 29 Cal. App. 3d at 900, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
94. 64 Cal. 3d 691, 705, 414 P.2d 633, 642, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417, 426 (1966).
95. People v. Nichols, 3 Cal. 3d 150, 474 P.2d 673, 89 Cal. Rptr. 721
(1970).
96. Id. at 158-62, 474 P.2d at 678-81, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 726-29.
97. See Historical Note, CAL. PEN. CODE § 459 (West 1972).
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at night, and break into a dwelling house of another created a
factual situation highly dangerous to any human being involved.
However, since 1872 the crime of burglary has been expanded
to include many activities which are not by definition inherently
dangerous. In 1875 and 1876 Penal Code section 459 was
amended to include within the definition of burglary any method
of entry whether in the daytime or night; added to the list of
protected structures were shops, warehouses, stores, mills, barns,
stables, outhouses or other buildings. Mines were added as pro-
tected areas in a 1913 amendment. In 1947 the statute was
amended to include trailer coaches and automobiles (if the doors
are locked) as well as aircraft.98  Clearly the emphasis of the
statute has changed from protecting human beings in their dwell-
ings from forcible entries to protecting property interests with-
out regard to human beings or the use of force in the manner
of entry.99
In Earl the defendant was involved in a characteristically
non-dangerous crime-shoplifting. It cannot reasonably be in-
ferred that when the legislature enacted the felony-murder rule
in 1872 it intended to include within its ambit killings which oc-
cur in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of such non-
violent types of crimes. The legislature was limiting, not expand-
ing, the felony-murder rule by enacting section 189.10 Subse-
quent amendments to section 189 have expanded it by adding
more felonies 011 but no amendment has specifically defined the
scope of burglary.
To arrive at a reasonable result in a given case, a court is
often pulled into the quagmire of determining legislative intent.
How the court extricates itself can be of critical importance. There
are basic precepts that guide a court when it is faced with such
a predicament. It is well settled that statutory interpretation
should be reasonable.102  In addition, the legislature's intention
should not be presumed to include harsh, absurd or unjust conse-
quences, 0 3 and the interpretation must consider the original pur-
pose and object of the legislation. 104 Had the Earl court followed
these precepts it would have found it incongruous to presume that
98. Id.
99. See WrraiN, CA FoRN A CRIMES § 451 (1963); Comment, Development
of the Law of Burglary in California, 25 S. CAL. L. REv. 75 (1951).
100. Prior to the enactment of section 189, murder committed during the
perpetration of any felony evoked the felony-murder rule. Section 189 limited
application of the rule to felonies enumerated in that section.
101. See note 91 supra.
102. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3542 (West 1972).
103. Artukovich v. Astendorf, 21 Cal. 2d 329, 131 P.2d 831 (1942); In re
Haines, 195 Cal. 605, 612-13 (1925).
104. H.S. Mann Corp. v. Moody, 144 Cal. App. 2d 310, 320, 301 P.2d 28, 35
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the legislature intended to include the expanded "property-protect-
ing" provisions of section 459 in section 189 when the original
purpose of the latter section was to confine the felony-murder doc-
trine. Furthermore, legislative amendments to section 189 have
added only the most dangerous felonies. 10 5  The court quoted the
comment in Talbot that both sections 189 and 459 of the Penal
Code have been amended more than once since their enact-
ment."" The implication may be that the legislature would have
narrowed the scope of burglary for purposes of section 189 had
it so chosen, and failure to do so signifies a contrary intent.
This conclusion is totally unwarranted. The legislature may
not have been aware of the need to act. It may have assumed
that the felony-murder rule was being applied narrowly to bur-
glaries since the application of the rule had been generally re-
stricted by judicial fiat. A failure of the legislature to act simply
does not compel the assumption that the legislature intends a
broad definition of burglary for purposes of section 189.107
In the Earl case it is possible that the jury would have con-
cluded that there was no malice aforethought in the commission
of the homicide because there was no clear showing that the kill-
ing was deliberate and premeditated. Without the felony-murder
instruction a first degree murder conviction was unlikely. To
predicate a harsh result on a questionable assumption of legislative
intent is unjust. The Earl court would have been faithful to
legislative intent and to the supreme court's restrictive view of the
felony-murder rule had it limited application of the rule to burgla-
ries as defined in 1872.108
(1956). The court reasoned that to correctly ascertain the intention of the legis-
lature it must consider the historical background and evident objective of the
statute.
105. See note 91 supra.
106. People v. Earl, 29 Cal. App, 3d 894, 900, 105 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835-36
(1973).
107. Furthermore, other jurisdictions have limited the felony-murder rule in
the face of statutes codifying the rule. See, e.g., cases cited at note 32 supra.
For example, in New York the statute provided that an unpremeditated killing
was first degree murder if committed by one engaged in the perpetration of
any felony. N.Y. PEN. CODE § 183, as amended, N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1044(McKinney 1967). Nevertheless, the New York courts have interpreted that
language to include only felonies independent of the homicide which do not
merge therein. People v. Wagner, 245 N.Y. 143, 156 N.E. 644 (1927); People
v. Hiiter, 184 N.Y. 237, 77 N.E. 6 (1906).
The California Supreme Court followed the same rationale in People v.
Wilson, I Cal. 3d 433, 462 P.2d 22, 82 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969). See text ac-
companying notes 23-26 supra.
108. Such a holding would not have precluded the court from applying the
second degree felony-murder rule if it determined that the particular type of
burglary, viewed in the abstract, is inherently dangerous. It is not clear that
such a conclusion would be reached. Considering the reasoning of Satchell and
Lopez it is more likely that the supreme court would expect the prosecution to
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Reliance on People v. Talbot'0 9 Was Erroneous
In addition to feeling constrained by legislative enactment
and intent, the court in Earl assumed that People v. Talbot pre-
vented it from reaching a different conclusion. An argument sim-
ilar to that made in Earl had been advanced in Talbot. However,
in Talbot the victim was killed when the assailant entered a dwell-
ing house with several felonious intents including, inter alia, rob-
bery. The activity in Talbot was clearly of a dangerous nature
and existence of malice was obvious from the facts of the murder
itself." 0 The conviction could have been founded on the basis
of premeditated, deliberate murder as easily as on murder com-
mitted in the perpetration of a burglary. Therefore, the automatic
finding of malice from application of the felony-murder rule was
of little consequence."' Unlike the situation in Earl, there is
every reason to suppose that the result would have been a convic-
tion of first degree murder had the felony-murder rule not been
used.
More importantly, the Talbot court specifically found that
the burglary therein would have been defined as burglary in
1872.112 Unquestionably, the felony-murder rule was correctly
utilized in Talbot. But what if the burglary would not have been
so defined in 1872? Dictum in the Talbot decision suggested
that the crime of burglary referred to in section 189 of the Penal
Code is the same as presently set forth in section 459."' This
dictum appears to be based on questionable application of an
1898 California Supreme Court decision that a felony-murder in-
struction is correct as a matter of law when the defendant enters
a house with the intent to kill. 1 4  Although this holding was per-
suasive for application of the felony-murder rule to the facts of
Talbot, it does not address itself to the scope of burglary for the
purposes of section 189. It is inexplicable why Justice Brown
demonstrate the required mental state of malice aforethought without resorting
to any felony-murder rule short-cut. See text accompanying notes 61-64 and
75 supra.
109. 64 Cal. 2d 691, 414 P.2d 633, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1966).
110. The facts of the case were that Talbot had planned to "roll" the victim
for the money he was to receive upon his forthcoming release from the service.
Talbot planned to gouge out the victim's eyes if he was recognized. Subse-
quently Talbot changed his plans and talked of running the victim down by car.
Then an accomplice attempted to gas the victim in his bedroom. When Talbot
entered the bedroom and found the victim was still conscious, he went outside,
returned with a wrench-type object made of steel, and struck the victim six or
seven times. He also stabbed him with a knife which he had concealed on his
person before coming to the house.
111. See note 64 supra.
112. 64 Cal. 2d 691, 704, 414 P.2d 633, 642, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417, 426 (1966).
113. Id. at 705, 414 P.2d at 642, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
114. See People v. Miller, 121 Cal. 343, 347, 53 P. 816, 818 (1898).
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chose to follow the questionable dictum of Talbot instead of the
trenchant judgments of recent supreme court cases. The Earl
court should have held that application of the felony-murder rule
was error.
CONCLUSION
The dangers intrinsic in the Earl decision are readily appar-
ent. If burglary as presently defined in section 459 will activate
section 189 as a matter of law, any shoplifter who kills can easily
be found guilty of first degree murder, even if he enters a
store unarmed, so long as he enters with the intent to commit
grand or petty theft. Considering the clear statement of the
California Supreme Court in People v. Washington"5 that the fel-
ony-murder rule should not be extended to situations where it
does not serve a rational function, such a result runs counter to
the current view of the felony-murder doctrine.
The supreme court has repeatedly applied the qualifying
principle espoused in Washington in such a way as to insure that
the "highly artificial concept" of strict criminal liability implicit
in the felony-murder doctrine be given narrow application consis-
tent with its purpose.1 6 The ostensible purpose of the felony-
murder rule is to deter those engaged in felonies from killing neg-
ilgently or accidentally. This purpose can be effectively served
by applying the second degree felony-murder rule to burglaries
the court determines are inherently dangerous to human life. But
the harshness of applying the statutory felony-murder rule to all
burglaries should have been avoided. The Earl decision sanctions
the proliferation of that rule beyond any boundary originally in-
tended when it was first codified in California as'a restrictive de-
vice. Furthermore, the Earl holding fails to recognize the increas-
ing reluctance of the supreme court to predicate findings of mur-
der on such an artificial device as the felony-murder rule." 7
Nancy Hoffman*
115. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783, 402 P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965).
116. See, e.g., People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 489 P.2d 1361, 98 Cal. Rptr.
33 (1971).
117. The California Supreme Court may have refused to grant a hearing in the
Earl case because it considered the harshness of the felony-murder rule to have
been mitigated somewhat by the abolition of capital punishment. It should be
noted that in the recently enacted amendments to the Penal Code which insti-
tute a mandatory death penalty for certain crimes, only burglary of an inhabited
dwelling house entered with an intent to commit grand or petit larceny or rape is
punishable by death. Senate Bill 450 § 5(b)(3)(v) enacted Sept. 24, 1973
(effective Jan. 1, 1974).
* The author wishes to thank John R. Triplett, attorney for Milton Earl,
for his helpful suggestions in the development of this comment.
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